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abStRact
Technological advances over the next few decades will mean that every cubic meter of the 
planet will be computationally accessible to surveillance, micromanagement and control. Such 
unprecedented power places an immense burden of responsibility on the planet’s cognitively 
dominant species – Homo sapiens. Status quo bias equates the natural with the morally good; 
yet the immense burden of suffering in Nature calls this intuition into question. Human and 
non-human animals typically flourish best when free-living rather than incarcerated or wild. 
This paper presents a costed case study of compassionate stewardship of an entire species 
of free-living non-human animals. The successful construction of an elephant welfare state 
would be a key historical milestone on the road to a compassionately run global ecosystem.
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1. intRoduction
1.1. High-tech Jainism?
Within the next few decades, the exponential growth of computer power 
will ensure every cubic metre of the planet is computationally accessible to 
remote monitoring, micro-management and control. Harnessed to biotech-
nology and nanorobotics, this growth in surveillance and control capabili-
ties presents huge risks and huge opportunities. In a dystopian vein, such 
technologies lend themselves to advanced war-fighting, or they could be 
used to sustain an Orwellian dictatorship. Alternatively, such technologies 
could deliver compassionate stewardship of the entire living world.
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High-tech Jainism  1 of the kind needed to safeguard the interests of 
smaller mammals, let alone the well-being of marine vertebrates and (ulti-
mately) members of other phyla, is still decades away. The CRISPR revolu-
tion in genome editing, for example, is only a few years old (Esvelt, Church, 
and Lunshof 2014). Nanotechnology, and in particular nanorobotics, is 
still in its infancy. Nevertheless, the obstacles to a cruelty-free world are not 
merely technical. Even as the technologies of intervention become cheaper 
and readily available, human status quo bias (Bostrom and Ord 2006) may 
postpone implementation of a compassionate biology indefinitely. The ide-
ology of conservation biology is deeply entrenched. So ambitious germline 
interventions to “reprogram” traditional predator species (Pearce 2009), 
orchestrate pan-species fertility regulation, and guarantee the well-being of 
all sentience in our forward light-cone are probably not on the horizon for 
a century or more. Yet this sort of timescale does not mean discussions 
on ethical intervention or stewardship are just idle philosophising. On the 
contrary, some forms of compassionate stewardship are technically feasible 
right now. Many of the worst and most morally urgent cases of wild animal 
suffering are the most accessible to intervention, and also the least expen-
sive to remedy.
1.2. Why elephants?
Launching our compassionate stewardship of the living world with free-liv-
ing elephants might seem an arbitrary choice of species. However, there are 
good reasons to choose elephants for a feasibility study. From a moral point 
of view, elephants are a prime candidate. With a brain weighing just over 
five kilograms, the African elephant has the largest brain of any terrestrial 
vertebrate. On some fairly modest assumptions, elephants are among the 
most sentient nonhuman animals. Moreover, all the technologies necessary 
for a comprehensive elephant healthcare program are available, in princi-
ple if not yet in practice. Nothing speculative or even especially futuristic 
in the way of high technology need be invoked to lay out the foundations 
of an elephant welfare state, although software tools for efficient remote 
monitoring and tele-diagnostics need further development. Admittedly, 
free-living elephants offer a comparatively easy example of compassionate 
 1 Jains aim never to harm another sentient being by word or deed. They are famous 
for sweeping the ground before them so that they do not inadvertently tread on insects. 
The term “high-tech Jainism” is intended to convey an analogous (secular) ethic practised 
towards all sentient beings through the use of modern technology. 
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species care. Elephants are large, long-lived, charismatic and herbivorous. 
No seemingly irreconcilable interests are involved (e.g. lions versus zebras) 
in safeguarding their interests because mature elephants typically have no 
natural predators besides Homo sapiens. Indeed, the limiting factor on ele-
phant population size in the absence of human predation or artificial fertil-
ity regulation is inadequate nutrition. Nevertheless, lions and hyenas will 
sometimes attack and eat alive juvenile, sick and injured elephants – the 
kind of horror that compassionate stewardship of Nature could prevent. 
2. aRe caRed-foR elephantS Really fRee-living?
Some critics of any blueprint for elephant welfare safety-net will contend 
that elephants who receive healthcare, food aid and emergency relief would 
no longer be “free-living”. This is not the place to explore the metaphysics 
of freedom, nor to enter human left-right political debate. Elephants are 
not economic actors – even if the expression “welfare state” gives libertar-
ians cause for alarm. In this context “welfare state” is politically neutral. 
Moreover, if intelligently run, crisis-interventions in time of drought need 
not give rise to an elephant “dependency culture” – this is not, after all, 
feeding time at the zoo.
Other critics will undoubtedly allege that elephants whom humans 
have assisted or saved from harm are no longer truly “wild” or “natural”. 
Nevertheless, humans who wear clothes or who take medicine are not 
thereby less human or somehow diminished compared to their “wild” con-
specifics. Likewise elephants.
Some animal advocates may claim that the use of immunocontracep-
tion in over-populated wildlife parks violates the presumed right of nonhu-
man animals to procreative freedom. It may also be claimed that intimate 
or remote monitoring as canvassed here violates the supposed right of 
nonhuman animals to privacy. Yet worries about privacy breaches, in par-
ticular, are an unwarranted anthropomorphic projection on our part. The 
alternative to fertility control is witnessing one’s calf slowly starve to death 
in a degraded habitat, or the brutal practice of “culling” (i.e. massacring 
whole elephant families) to prevent ecological devastation (Aarde, Whyte, 
and Pimm 1999). Nevertheless, even if it were the case that elephants did 
experience some loss of freedom due to human intervention, the suffering 
they would otherwise endure is far worse. The loss of a calf or a child, or 
of a matriarch or a mother, is traumatic for elephants and humans alike 
(Bradshaw 2004).
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3. the coStS of inteRvention
What would be the financial cost at contemporary prices of cradle-to-the-
grave healthcare and welfare provision for the entire population of free-
living African elephants? The elephant population of the African continent 
currently stands at around 500,000 (WWF 2015). Elephant taxonomy is 
currently in flux, but the half-million figure includes what is commonly 
known as the savannah (or bush) elephant, Loxodonta africana, and the 
forest species of elephant, Loxodonta cyclotis. An annual cost of somewhere 
between two and three billion dollars seems plausible. Similarly, most of 
the same challenges and opportunities arise for securing the well-being of 
the Asian elephant, Elephas maximus – an estimated of whom 40,000 are 
left in the wild (WWF 2015). So the type of program sketched out below 
could also be implemented in South-East Asia, at a fraction of the price.
Most human healthcare expenses are incurred in the last six months, and 
often the last six weeks, of life (Alemayehu and Warner 2004). In the case of 
elephants, we simply do not know the upper bounds to life-expectancy, given 
adequate late-life dentition. Assuming effective orthodontic care, this particu-
lar challenge – i.e. managing the age-related infirmities of free-living geriatric 
elephants – will (presumably) be decades away from the launch of an ortho-
dontic healthcare service. After being GPS chipped, vaccinated and (where 
necessary) provided with immunocontraception, most free-living elephants 
could be remotely monitored, but otherwise largely left in peace – apart from 
during years of severe drought and famine, when costly crisis-interventions 
will be necessary. To flourish, free-living elephants need a habitat that offers 
fresh water, some available shade, plentiful vegetation for grazing and brows-
ing. A mature African bush elephant typically ingests over 200 kilograms of 
vegetable matter daily (Tchamba and Seme 1993). Therefore, the elephant 
emergency equivalent of humanitarian daily rations will be quite bulky. 
When needed, the cost of providing additional vaccinations, vitamin 
and mineral supplements, painkillers, anti-inflammatories, parasiticides, 
sedatives and anaesthetics, antibiotics, antifungals and antivirals, disinfect-
ants and cleaning agents will not be negligible; but the relevant agents are 
almost all off-patent. 
Training and labour costs of ancillary support staff in sub-Saharan 
Africa are comparatively low and likely to remain so for the foresee-
able future. Close, politically sensitive collaboration with the local human 
populations will be vital to the long-term success of the project. Elephant 
healthcare work could provide valuable employment, though some forms 
of expertise could be delivered only by specialist veterinarians. Finally, an 
air-ambulance service would incur significant transport costs.
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3.1. Immunocontraception
Ivory poaching and habitat destruction have dramatically reduced unpro-
tected elephant populations over the course of the past 200 years (Red 
List 2014). However, in favourable conditions elephant populations may 
increase at four to five percent per year (ibid.). Inevitably, such growth is 
ecologically unsustainable. In the long run, humans will have to choose 
the overall level and demographic profile of elephant populations in our 
wildlife parks, or otherwise let Nature (i.e. famine and malnutrition-related 
deaths) take its course. The victims of “natural” disasters will mainly be 
the young, the sick and the old. As with tomorrow’s humans, advances 
in behavioural genetics and reproductive technologies will shortly allow 
use of preimplantation genetic screening to choose everything from pain 
thresholds – cf. variant pain-modulating alleles of the SCN9A gene (Rei-
mann et al. 2010) – to susceptibility to depression – cf. the role of the 
COMT  gene and serotonin transporter 5-HTTLPR gene (Wichers et al. 
2008) – to personality variables. Or alternatively, policy makers may opt 
to perpetuate the traditional genetic roulette of sexual reproduction. Once 
again, political and moral choices will be unavoidable.
3.2. Neonatal care
Provision of prenatal elephant care is potentially expensive. Elephants typi-
cally give birth to one calf, less than one percent of births involving twins. 
However, one and often both calves usually die within weeks or months of 
birth (Mumby et al. 2013a). Intervention here will be needed to ensure a 
favourable outcome.
An elephant calf’s first year of life is their most hazardous. Immediately 
after birth, the young calf is most vulnerable to predation by lions, hunting 
dogs and hyenas. In the face of potential predators, the calf’s mother will 
vigorously defend her new-born. Unfortunately, the calf may not always be 
able to keep in the secure position under her mother’s abdomen. Moreover, 
the calf will still be vulnerable to predators for some years to come. After 
six months or so, the youngster starts to move further from their mother. 
If potential predators are near, she is at risk of being left behind if the herd 
is disturbed or stampeded (Loveridge 2006). Causes of juvenile death, 
though, include not just predation, but also disease, accidents, drought, 
starvation, nutritional deficiencies, stress, heat stress, drowning, becoming 
trapped in mud holes, snake bite and congenital malformation. All things 
considered, mortality rates during the first three years range from below 
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10% to more than 50%, and is liable to increase when ranges are restricted 
and habitats change, as opportunities for browsing and midday shade 
become less available (Lee and Moss 1986).
A calf normally continues suckling at least until two years old. After 
weaning, annual elephant mortality rates decrease to perhaps 5% or 6% 
until about the age of 50 years only to rise sharply in the sixth decade 
(Carey and Gruenfelder 1997). Nevertheless, orphaned elephants will need 
special protection. Unaided, orphaned young elephants below the age of 
two or three years rarely survive in the wild. In a few countries, the basic 
infrastructure of elephant orphanages is already in place (see, for example, 
The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust). Such rescue and rehabilitation ser-
vices just need extension, systematisation and adequate funding.
3.3. Injuries, disease prevention and treatment
Elephants are normally robust and peaceable. However, fights do occur, 
particularly between bull elephants disputing access to a female in oestrus 
(De Waal and Tyack 2009). Occasionally, one or both parties may be 
badly injured in such aggressive encounters. Bone fractures will need to be 
treated by elephant orthopaedic specialists.
Regarding diseases, some ailments are specific to elephants, notably 
trunk paralysis and elephant pox, but other afflictions are common to 
humans and elephants alike, ranging from intestinal colic and constipation 
to pneumonia. Like humans, elephants are susceptible to infection by tuber-
culosis, mosquito-borne diseases and anthrax, which may be contracted via 
contaminated water or soil (Wildpro 2015). Additionally, elephants may 
even catch the common cold, though this condition is self-limiting.
Ill elephants often attempt to self-medicate, treating digestive diseases 
through fasting or consumption of bark, bitter herbs or alkaline earth 
(Wildpro 2015). Such limited self-treatment can be complemented by 
human expertise in scientific medicine.
3.4. Elephant orthodontics
Human depredations aside, the greatest source of mature elephant morbid-
ity and mortality is inadequate nutrition. Elephants replace their teeth mul-
tiple times. The fifth set of chewing teeth (molars) lasts until the elephant 
is in his or her early forties. The sixth – and usually final – set must last the 
elephant the rest of his or her life. As the final set of molars wears away 
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during the late fifties, the elephant is no longer able adequately to chew 
food. This will cause them to die from the effects of malnutrition or starva-
tion (The Scotsman 2004).
Free-living elephants do not usually live much past sixty years. Elderly 
elephant deaths generally occur during the dry season (Dudley et al. 2001). 
This is because dry food cannot be effectively sheared by the residual 
smooth grinding surface of the worn-down sixth molar. The weakened 
and emaciated elephant will eventually collapse. Helpless, she may then be 
eaten alive by scavengers and predators. Late-life orthodontics to prevent 
this fate will be more cost-effective than routine GPS tracking or immuno-
contraception, because the material used for false teeth could last decades 
without need for replacement.
3.5. Drought
During drought, deaths normally occur due to starvation, malnutrition, 
and heat stress, rather than thirst. This is because elephants are reluctant 
to leave known water-sources to find food. Constructing and maintaining 
artificial waterholes during severe drought will be necessary to prevent 
such deaths. However, the congregation of herds of undernourished and 
malnourished elephants at remaining water-holes will make provision of 
crisis nutritional support easier and cheaper. 
3.6. Elephant psychiatric care
Like people, elephants may suffer low mood, anxiety disorders and depres-
sion (Bradshaw et al. 2005). Elephants grieve when they lose a calf or 
another close family member. Psychosis also occurs, but rarely for elephants 
in their natural habitat, and primarily as consequence of captivity. Similarly 
to humans, incidence of endogenous depression is lower when elephants are 
living in their natural habitat in small family groups, rather than suffering 
solitary confinement in captivity. Post-traumatic stress disorder in the after-
math of being hunted or natural trauma could potentially be treated with 
inexpensive anxiolytics, such as beta-blockers. Determining the appropriate 
drug dosage in different treatment regimens still depends on metabolic scal-
ing formulas. Such crude procedures are used because comparatively few 
pharmacokinetic studies have been conducted to provide elephant-specific 
information. If an ethical discipline of compassionate biology replaces a doc-
trinaire conservation biology, this relative lack of studies can be remedied.
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3.7. Uncertainties
For now, financial projections of comprehensive free-living elephant care 
can depend only on rough and imprecise calculations, rather than on a 
rigorous methodology. But an estimated annual expense of $2.5 billion for 
full healthcare and welfare provision for the entire population of free-living 
African elephants may turn out to be pessimistic. In practice, the great 
majority of Africa’s 500,000 elephant population would need far less than 
the annual $5,000 per head that this figure allows. Neuro-chipping, individ-
ual genome sequencing, vaccinations, GPS-tracking and (when appropriate) 
immunocontraception would cost, at most, a few hundred dollars per head. 
Moreover, the first three of these would typically be a one-off expense rather 
than a regular part of the annual budget. Given that chipping is feasible 
and inexpensive for domesticated dogs in the UK (BBC 2013), it should be 
no less feasible for free-living elephants. Here, chipping could range from 
simple tagging to more complex remote-monitoring of health status.
Nevertheless, financial planners will need to bear in mind the potential 
for cost overruns and unexpected expenses that plague any new enterprise. 
These may include (unfortunately) the costs of corruption, maladministra-
tion and the growth of a welfare bureaucracy – the expense of which are 
hard to quantify. 
Finally, there is the issue of timescale for complete coverage of Africa’s 
elephant population. Perhaps one or two years – but only if an interna-
tional consensus existed.
4. the SpecieSiSt objection
4.1. The objection from the priority of human interests
Suppose that one accepts that this system of compassionate stewardship is 
feasible. Even then, the seemingly compelling objection can be raised that 
establishing a system to care for free-living elephants is not a moral priority. 
Millions of humans do not yet enjoy an adequate welfare safety net. Also 
that the cost of an elephant welfare program could be more fruitfully spent 
promoting human welfare instead. What Africa needs is a welfare program 
for its human population, rather than its elephants. 
Whatever our response to this objection, our answer should not be 
clouded by arbitrary anthropocentric bias, i.e. speciesism (Horta 2010). It 
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is worth stressing that anti-speciesism is not the claim that “all animals are 
equal”, or that all species are of equivalent value, or that the well-being of 
a human – or an elephant – is as important as the well-being of a mosquito. 
Rather it is the claim that, other things being equal, all animals, human 
and nonhuman, of equivalent sentience are of equal value and deserve 
equal consideration. The anti-speciesist argues that morally what matters 
in resource allocation is not ethnic group or species membership but sen-
tience.
The widely held idea that distinctively human cognitive capacities cor-
relate with a higher degree of sentience lacks scientific support. Microelec-
trode studies of the human brain using awake subjects confirm that the 
most intense forms of sentience, notably our core limbic emotions, are also 
the most phylogenetically primitive, whereas the phenomenology associated 
with such distinctively human cognitive capacities as higher mathematics 
or generative syntax is also the most subtle and rarefied. Indeed, the phe-
nomenology of language-generation is barely accessible to introspection.
In addition, abundant evidence suggests that elephants are at least as 
sentient as human toddlers. Elephants can pass the “mirror test”, thereby 
demonstrating a capacity for reflective self-awareness. The elephant hip-
pocampus is comparatively larger than human hippocampus, presumably 
a function of an elephant’s prodigious memory. Elephants are endowed 
with an immense, highly convoluted neocortex subserving their complex 
tactile, visual, acoustic and olfactory communication systems and capacity 
for empathetic understanding (Byrne et al. 2008). They also display sophis-
ticated social cognition (ibid.). More controversially, their comparatively 
larger limbic systems suggest that elephants may be at least as sentient as 
adult humans, albeit lacking the logico-mathematical and linguistic prow-
ess of Homo sapiens (Shoshani et al. 2006). Either way, even if, cautiously 
and conservatively, we judge that elephants are no more sentient than 
prelinguistic human toddlers, we still have a duty to protect their inter-
ests – in the same way that affluent countries have an ethical duty to help 
vulnerable children in developing nations.
4.2. The objection from the priority of human-inflicted harm
A more compelling objection to implementing an elephant care program 
is that our overriding ethical priority should be ending the suffering for 
which humans are directly responsible. In this regard, factory-farming is 
the greatest source of severe and readily avoidable suffering in the world 
today. Most humans are complicit or financially implicated in the nonhu-
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man animal holocaust. Even though a pig, for example, is of comparable 
sentience to a prelinguistic toddler (Angier 2009) humans routinely do 
things to factory-farmed pigs that would earn a life-sentence in prison if our 
victims were human. Certainly, the development and commercialisation 
of in vitro meat holds the promise of global veganism or invitrotarianism, 
perhaps later this century  2. In the meantime, though, billions of sentient 
beings will have been abused and slaughtered to satisfy our taste for their 
flesh. 
5. concluSion
For better or worse, humans and their descendants will be responsible for 
life on Earth for the indefinite future. Despite the initially daunting tech-
nical challenges, the biggest obstacle to compassionate stewardship of the 
world’s free-living nonhuman animal population is not technical or even 
financial, but rather, ideological. Most people are prone to status quo bias. 
Such innate bias is normally rationalised by some version of the “appeal to 
Nature”: what is natural is good.
The irrationality of the “appeal to Nature” is illustrated by a simple 
thought-experiment. Imagine, fancifully, if starvation, disease, parasitism, 
disembowelling, asphyxiation and being eaten alive were not endemic to 
the living world – or that such miseries had already been abolished. Cer-
tainty, no one would propose there is an ethical case for (re)introducing 
them. Even proposing such a thought-experiment can sound faintly ridicu-
lous. 
However, our bioconservativism is not wholly consistent. If presented 
with a specific case of terrible suffering – for example an elephant mother 
and her calf trapped in a mud hole – most people argue we should intervene 
rather than permit the horror to unfold “naturally”. Human benevolence is 
typically weak, erratic, often negligible, and sentimental rather than rule-
bound – but still real. By focusing initially on grisly concrete examples, a 
broad consensus on the principle of compassionate intervention can poten-
tially be established, though not of course whether intervention should be 
piecemeal or systematic – or how it should be funded. Eliciting support for 
 2 See for example, The In Vitro Meat Consortium (http://www.invitromeat.org/); 
Future Food (http://www.futurefood.org/in-vitro-meat/index_en.php); New Harvest (http://
www.new-harvest.org/cultured-meat/faq/).
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ad hoc animal “rescues” is the critical wedge that advocates of compassion-
ate stewardship of Nature need to press their case further.
Once we accept that intervention to prevent suffering in free-living 
nonhuman animals is sometimes morally permitted, and sometimes even 
morally required, a straightforward question then arises: Why should free-
living animal suffering matter only when humans happen to notice it? We 
should think seriously, as a species, about what principle(s) should govern 
our interventions. If we can underwrite the well-being of elephants, we 
should aim, ultimately, to extend our compassionate stewardship to the 
rest of the living world. 
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